Gender Quotas Increase the Equality and Effectiveness of Climate Interventions
Cook, N. J., T. Grillos, K. P. Andersson. 2019. Nature Climate Change 9(4): 330-334.
Abstract: Interventions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions strive to promote gender balance so that men and women have equal rights to participate in, and benefit from, decision making associated with such interventions. The conventional way to achieve gender balance in interventions is to introduce gender quotas. While such quotas are often justified on the grounds of fairness and equal rights, we propose that gender quotas can also help climate policy interventions become more effective. To test this idea, we use a randomized lab-in-the-field experiment in which local forest users in 28 villages in Indonesia, Peru, and Tanzania made decisions about extraction and conservation in a commonly held forest. We randomly assigned a gender quota to half of the participating groups, requiring that at least 50% of group members were women. Groups with the gender quota conserved more forest resources as a response to a Payments for Ecosystem Services intervention and shared this payment more equally. Our analysis further shows that the inequality-reducing effect of the quota was due to the overall gender composition of the group, not the promotion of women to leadership positions. One of the policy implications of this result is that interventions would benefit from introducing gender quotas that go beyond a minimalist approach – which merely seeks to improve gender balance – to ensure that at least half of the members of decision-making groups are women.
Experimental Evidence on Payments for Forest Commons Conservation
Andersson, K. P., N. J. Cook, T. Grillos … and E. Mwangi. 2018. Nature Sustainability 1(3): 128-135.
Abstract: Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) represent a popular strategy for environmental protection, and tropical forest conservation in particular. Little is known, however, about how tropical forest users respond to PES interventions, or how the characteristics of local users might influence the effectiveness of PES incentives. Many argue that even if PES increases conservation in the short-run, it may adversely affect other motivations for environmental behavior, potential damaging conservation efforts in the longer-run, once payments are removed. We propose that conditional payments can help forest users to conserve their shared forest resources, even after payments end, especially when users trust each other. Using a framed field experiment with 1,200 tropical forest users in five countries, we test these ideas and show that (1) during the PES intervention, conditional payments increased conservation behavior; (2) even after payments stopped, users continued to conserve more than they did before the PES intervention, and (3) trust amplified the lasting conservation effects of the PES interventions. Our findings suggest that policy actors can increase PES program effectiveness by designing interventions that facilitate and promote interpersonal communication, and by prioritizing implementation in contexts where forest users enjoy high levels of trust.
Local Politics of Forest Governance: Why NGO Support Can Undermine Local Government Responsiveness
Cook, N. J., G. D. Wright, and K. P. Andersson. 2017. World Development 92: 203-214.
Abstract: Concerned with the challenges of sustainable development, policy makers and scholars often urge nongovernmental organizations to increase their efforts to support governance of natural resources in developing countries. How does funding from external NGOs influence the responsiveness of local government policy to the sector-specific needs and policy preferences of local citizens? Using a unique longitudinal dataset from surveys of local governance actors in 200 municipalities in Bolivia and Guatemala, we explore these questions in the context of local natural resource policy. We find preliminary support for the hypothesis that external NGOs gain disproportionate influence over local policy processes in forestry by donating to local governments, and that this influence “crowds out” the influence of local grassroots actors, leading to less responsive local governance as rated by local citizens. However, political pressure on local government officials from organized local groups in the forestry sector counteracts this negative effect. These findings call into question the idea that financial support from outside NGOs to local governance actors will always produce more responsive policy outcomes, especially where local citizen groups do not actively communicate their demands to local politicians. More generally, our findings underscore the importance of local political contexts in moderating the effects of NGO interventions.